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File sharing, typically involving video or audio material in which copy-
right may persist and using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks like BitTorrent,
has been reported to make up the bulk of Internet traffic (Pouwelse et al.,
2008; Kryczka et al., 2011). The free-riding problem appears in this “digital
gift economy” but its users exhibit rational behaviour (Becker and Clement,
2006), subject to the characteristics of the particular network (Feldman et al.,
2006). The high demand for the Internet as a delivery channel for enter-
tainment (Alleman and Rappoport, 2009) underlines the importance of under-
standing the dynamics of this market, especially when considering possible
business models for future pricing or licensing regimes (Gervais, 2004) and
for the provisioning of network capacity to support future services. The avail-
ability of specific titles on file sharing networks is the focus of this paper,
with a special emphasis on the P2P protocol BitTorrent. The paper compares
the incentives provided in BitTorrent to those in other file-sharing communi-
ties, including file hosting, and discusses the number of titles available in the
community at any given time, with an emphasis on popular video items with
ambiguous legal status (Watters et al., 2011).
Introduction
The main object of this research is to understand
how incentives operate in the world of (mainly
anonymous) file sharing, to produce a spectrum
of available content. The mechanism for sharing
will clearly influence the amount of content avail-
able to any specific individual seeking such content
online. After all, the proliferation of the technol-
ogy for home audio and video taping in the 1970s
and 1980s created an environment in which any
individual had easy access to all material under
the control of their conventional social peers but
not more. The legal controversy (Lessig, 2004) of
then and now is however not the main topic of this
work.
The Internet, together with digital multimedia
formats, has enabled media sharing (like many
other things) to take place between complete
strangers all over the globe and with lossless trans-
mission of the content. The use of file-sharing
networks for distributing unauthorised copies of
copyrighted material is of concern to the me-
dia and publications industries (Holsapple et al.,
2008) and one reaction has been attempts by au-
thorities in many countries to either block file-
sharing traffic or to ban access to websites indexing
such content, recently in Italy and reportedly even
more stringently in the United Kingdom (Arthur,
2010). Given the high percentage of Internet traf-
fic involving file sharing (Gummadi et al., 2003;
Menasche et al., 2009; Plissonneau et al., 2005;
Pouwelse et al., 2008) this is of particular concern
also in the debate around network neutrality.
The high demand for the Internet as a de-
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livery channel for audio-visual entertainment
(Alleman and Rappoport, 2009) underlines the im-
portance of understanding the dynamics of this
market, especially when considering possible busi-
ness models for future pricing or licensing regimes
(Gervais, 2004) and for the provisioning of net-
work capacity to support future services. This is
of particular interest when it becomes a matter of
public policy, for instance where tax-funded in-
vestment in new generation networks (NGNs) are
being considered.
The availability of specific titles on file sharing
networks is the focus of this paper, with a special
emphasis on the peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol Bit-
Torrent. An overview of the operation of the net-
work will be given and we shall consider the model
proposed by Menasche et al. (2009) for content
avaibility in BitTorrent swarms. Alternatives to
P2P are briefly considered and finally some factors
determining the availability of titles are discussed,
together with data illustrating users’ behaviour on
the network.
Altruism in file-sharing
File sharing communities on the Internet are
characterised by a high degree of anonymity, es-
pecially in light of the (somewhat remote) possi-
bility of prosecution or (more likely) threatening
letters from Internet service providers (ISPs). In-
deed, these communities are responding to attacks
from copyright holders by evolving more sophisti-
cated mechanisms for maintaining anonymity. Un-
like the taping and mix-taping of earlier decades,
where the sharing communities presumably coin-
cided with ordinary social networks, file sharing
requires a degree of altruism that is not backed
up by an implicit offline social quid-pro-quo con-
vention. Nevertheless, a lot of file sharing be-
tween strangers evidently does take place. The
rôle of altruism in these networks has been stud-
ied by many people, e.g. Feldman et al. (2006).
Basically, small costs can be imposed for free-
riding. Furthermore, there are closed networks
where this is not a problem and users exhibit ra-
tional behaviour within this digital gift economy
(Becker and Clement, 2006) subject to the charac-
teristics of the particular network (Feldman et al.,
2006).
The principle of P2P networking is illustrated by
the following toy example. Suppose that a single
publisher1 of some specific content appears on the
network where a single potential recipient is wait-
ing. If the recipient (or, leecher) is not prepared to
donate anything to others on the network, and the
publisher (or, seeder) is prepared to donate only
one copy, the net effect will be that the leecher
downloads a single copy and the publisher donates
one copy. Further leechers arriving on the network
and seeking a copy will not be serviced. However,
should leechers be prepared to act as peers, i.e. to
let other download from them, then a large number
of copies can be distributed from a single seeder.
Suppose n leechers appear simultaneously, while
the original seeder is available, and each leecher
is prepared to donate only the equivalent of n−1
n
copies of the file. Then, it becomes possible for
each of the leechers to obtain the entire file in the
following way.
1. Let the k-th leecher download the k-th part of
the file, of size 1
n
, so that the seeder will have do-
nated only a total of one full copy of the file.
2. Now, let each leecher donate his/her fraction
1
n
of the desired file to each of the n−1 other leech-
ers.
At this point each leecher will have obtained a full
copy of the file but will have uploaded less than a
full copy of the content.
It is easy to see how some free-riding can be
accommodated within the system. Suppose there
were, as above, n peers and one seed but also a sin-
gle leecher not willing or able to upload any con-
tent. If each of the n original peers is prepared to
donate a full copy of the content, only step 2 above
need be modified to enable the free-riding leecher
to also obtain a full copy of the content. Obvi-
1Here publisher signifies any entity or individual
making a file available to others, and not necessarily
the copyright owner or offline publisher.
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ously many more free-riding leechers could be ser-
viced, should sufficiently many peers be prepared
to make available even more than a single multi-
ple of the content. Equally obviously, the ability
of leechers to download desired content is entirely
dependent on the willingness of peers to make the
content available to others.
The toy example is simplistic and does not even
incorporate the influence of accidental sharing by
leechers. In the case of very popular content, most
P2P clients will automatically share chunks of con-
tent already downloaded while not yet in posses-
sion of the complete file and will continue seeding
the content once the download has been completed
until either
• a prescribed share ratio (number of full copy
equivalents shared to others) has been reached, or
• the client or torrent is stopped manually by the
user.
In the case of popular content just after publica-
tion, many leechers will unintentionally act in a
very altruistic way since they will, while waiting
for a download to complete, facilitate many up-
loads of the same material to others, also since
the demand is high at these times. Such uninten-
tional peering probably contributes significantly to
the availability of titles shortly after release, for
example popular television shows in the days af-
ter which they have been broadcast or otherwise
leaked to the public. Even though the preceding il-
lustrates that free-riding can be accommodated in a
file sharing community, the presence of a commu-
nity of BitTorrent publishers with a financial incen-
tive has been hypothesized (Cuevas et al., 2010).
Consider the (perhaps rather unscientific) statis-
tics published by the website KickAssTor-
rents.com in Table 1, harvested from the BitTorrent
tracker PublicBT.com for episodes from Season
6 of the series Desperate Housewives published
through the highly regard and prolific EZTV.
Availability of Episode 1 seems good even after
several months although the amount of leeching
going on at a specific time is not very high at all,
the number of downloaders being just over 1%
Table 1
Availability on PublicBT.com for two selected
episodes of Desperate Housewives
File name Date Seeders Leechers
. . . S06E20. . . 27 April 2010 10 113 3 863
. . . S06E01. . . 27 April 2010 334 48
of the number observed less than 48 hours after
episode 20 of the show was shown on ABC broad-
cast television in the United States. Clearly the
amount of free-riding or miserly sharing is much
higher early in the life of the swarm.2
The BitTorrent network
The BitTorrent protocol3 enjoys widespread use
and has been implemented on many platforms. It
is also the primary protocol supported by the fa-
mous PirateBay portal for online content and sub-
ject of frequent legal action. However, BitTorrent
(BT) is also used for distributing software such as
installation discs for new Linux distributions and
for scientific data (Langille and Eisen, 2010). The
main reason for the success of BT is that it scales
very well when demand increases. As outlined cur-
sorily above, a P2P distribution system can eas-
ily accommodate a very high demand for a certain
large file of collection of files without a specif-
ically high degree of investment at any specific
node (Izal et al., 2004). In fact, free-riding appears
to be the only problem other than unavailability of
content. It will be helpful for the discussion below
to describe briefly the operation of a BT network,
from the user’s point of view.
A prospective user of general content will typi-
cally visit a torrent index site such as PirateBay4 or
AnimeSuki5 where the potential downloader will
click on a file with the .torrent file extension (or,
2A single title can be available in many swarms
(Vinkó et al., 2012). The statistics in Table 1 are for
a single swarm.
3Invented by Bram Cohen.
4http://thepiratebay.org/
5http://www.animesuki.com/
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more recently, a .magnet file). This torrent file
will contain references to specific torrent tracking
servers and might well be opened automatically
by BT client software6 on the user’s computer so
that the user will not necessarily even be aware of
the torrent file per se. The BT will start querying
the trackers listed in the torrent file as part of the
process of joining a swarm. The tracker servers
will provide information about actual peers already
in the swarm and the new peer will start request-
ing, and eventually offerings, parts of the file to be
download. The download time experienced by the
user depends very much on the conditions in the
swarm (Chiu and Eun, 2008).
The BT swarm as M/G/∞ queue
Menasche et al. (2009) describe a BT swarm
as an M/G/∞ queue (Browne and Steele, 1993).
That is, the swarm is supposed to consist of pub-
lishers which appear at irregular intervals and
peers with Poisson arrivals. The queuing system
is busy as long as the title remains available from
peers that are online. They deduce estimates for
the expected length of a busy period under various
assumptions w.r.t. peer behaviour. For example,
if all peers are selfish and leave as soon as com-
pleting their download has been completed, the ex-
pected length of a busy period is
B =
es(r+λ )/µ −1
r+λ
where s is the size of the file, µ is the mean down-
load rate of peers, r the arrival rate of publishers
and λ the arrival rate of peers. It is further assumed
that peers who arrive when the content is not avail-
able, immediately leave. Publishers are assumed
to stay online only for a time sµ , i.e. long enough
to serve one copy of the content. The reader will
be able to confirm, at a glance, that B behaves as
common sense would suggest when µ → ∞ and
λ → ∞. One can also observe that doubling the
size of the file from s to 2s would increase the size
of B by a factor of
e2s(r+λ )/µ −1
es(r+λ )/µ −1
which is very substantial. The busy periods will
generally be much longer in a swarm with file size
2s than the sum of the expected busy times of two
separate swarms with file size s. Menasche et al.
(2009) obtain much more precise mathematical es-
timates of the advantage in terms of availability in
large swarms and could thereby present a convinc-
ing explanation of content bundling7.
Predictions by the model of Menasche et al.
(2009) are consistent with a vast amount of data on
real networks investigated in their study. The data
in their work showed 80% of swarms as unavail-
able at least 80% of the time. Nevertheless, their
model might be inappropriate for the large amount
of BT activity that consists of the distribution of
material within the first few weeks (or days) after
it appears. If this initial burst of activity is take into
account, the arrival rate of publishers and peers is
certainly far from constant, as one can clearly see
in Table 2 where it seems clear that activity peaked
about 36 hours after the swarm was constituted and
the declined rather rapidly. The M/G/∞ queue
also has no room for incorporating individual be-
haviour or system-wide constraints such as the to-
tal amount of available storage and bandwidth and
possibly limited demand for audio-visual content.
A fluid model
Qiu and Srikant (2004) use partical differential
equations to describe a fluid model for BT swarms.
As om the model of Menasche et al. (2009) the pa-
rameters like peer arrival are assumed to be con-
6For example, Vuze or BitTornado.
7Content bundling is the phenomenon where indi-
vidual books or episodes of a television series are not
available as single files but only in a bundled torrent
consisting, for example, of hundreds of e-books on a
particular topic, or of all of a specific season of a tele-
vision series.
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Date and time Seeding Leeching
27 April 2010, 15:32:30 10 113 3 863
27 April 2010, 19:15:01 11 187 5 132
27 April 2010, 21:19:10 11 000 4 872
27 April 2010, 22:31:42 9 664 4 468
28 April 2010, 22:16:10 7 701 2 445
29 April 2010, 05:20:27 4 640 1 078
29 April 2010, 21:32:32 6 825 1 887
30 April 2010, 07:35:36 4 416 840
Table 2
Torrent activity for Desperate Housewives S06E20
during the week after its first broadcast, from kick-
asstorrents.com, reported for tracker.publicbt.com
and a swarm formed on 26 April 2010 with purpo-
sive sampling.
stant. They prove the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium under certain conditions and have experimen-
tal data that appears to validate their model under
the given assumptions.
Anonymous file hosting
Anonymous file hosting is another way of shar-
ing content when the publisher does not necessar-
ily want to do so openly, possibly out of fear of
political persecution, harrassment or of prosecu-
tion for possibly copyright violations. An anony-
mous file host allows users to upload a file to
an Internet web page with a generic name8 that
gives no indication of the content of the file stored
there. The uploader might place a link to the web
page in an Internet forum or circulate it in another
way. Registration is not required of casual users
but the business model of these providers of one-
click hosting evidently includes enticing users to
take out a subscription which allows downloading
files without the waiting time imposed on casual
users of the free service. Subscribers also enjoy
faster download speeds and file hosting offers a far
greater degree of anonymity than P2P distribution
(Blond et al., 2010a,b) i.a. since both publishers
and peers are exposed for only as long as it takes to
transfer the file from/to the hosting site. It is quite
clear that one-click hosting has created a revenue
model for content sharing, whether legal or pos-
sibly illegal, and Antoniades et al. (2009) observe
that of a list of 100 unpopular film titles, more are
available on RapidShare than on BitTorrent.
Title availability
In this section, we consider the characteristics
of an ideal and fairly complete model of title avail-
ability. First, consider the salient features of the
networked digital multi-media world.
Hollywood universality Antoniades et al. (2009)
found 100% availability on PirateBay for the
top 50 US DVD rental titles for the week
under investigation but only 76% availabil-
ity for Amazon’s top 25 German films of all
time. Anecdotal evidence suggests that pop-
ular US television series become available
within a few hours of airing and are nearly
universally available because of the ease of
digital home recording.
Ease of copy The cost of copying a computer file
is nearly zero and does not degrade the
original copy. Hence, even compared to
relatively inexpensive media such as CD
or DVD discs, the marginal cost of re-
production is exceptionally low for com-
puter copies. Further, digital rights man-
agement (DRM) is not particularly efficient9
and there is no limit to the number of copies
of a particular item a consumer can make.
As more consumers source their entertain-
ment from unencrypted digital sources, the
smaller the impact of DRM will become.
Storage efficiency Digital media can be quite ef-
ficiently stored. A single portable computer
hard disk can store hundreds or thousands of
films in a space no greater than that of a sin-
gle DVD box.
8http://rapidshare.com/files/16433818/ for example.
9Not least of all because of the analog hole.
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Open borders There are no customs inspections
on the Internet and with relatively inexpen-
sive bandwidth in many places, the cost of
transmitting digital content is low. Stor-
age capacity of offline media has not in-
creased sufficiently quickly in order to make
the physical transport of media files an effi-
cient proposition.
In view of the German film example, we sup-
pose only that almost all English-language content
produced for US television or cinema audiences,
is available in digital format on some computer
which is connected to the Internet. Such material
would, for many, constitute a perfectly acceptable
source of entertainment, perhaps to the extent that
they would need no other. It is not quite the case
yet but one might also assume that each poten-
tial consumer has sufficient storage space available
to archive a full copy of this corpus. The corpus
grows only slowly and perhaps slowly enough that
a typical residential user in the US could download
the entire accrual each day.
Assume, for argument’s sake, that Hollywood
is somehow wiped out and that the corpus stops
growing. In this case, it would be of benefit to
each user to download the entire corpus and this
would be possible, in principle, using P2P if each
user is only prepared to contribute approximately
as much as they download. This would be a real
socialist utopia, but for the problem of enforcing
cooperation and punishing free-riding. Since even
BT is subject to opportunistic strategic manipula-
tion (Levin et al., 2008) the availability of titles is
still very much subject to constraints on storage,
network use and the problem of free-riding. How-
ever, many tests have shown BT to be an efficient
allocator of resources and P2P could very well be
one of the mechanisms that would assist in a fair
allocation of network resources on the Interent, a
network not initially designed for commercial use.
In the discussion above, it has been taken for
granted that consumers of content have a fixed
preference in terms of quality. That is, given a
specific unit of artistic content (an episode of Des-
perate Housewives, for example) corresponds to
a specific chunk of data with associated storage
and transmission costs. However, the prolifera-
tion of high-definition display devices means that
consumers now increasingly prefer high-definition
content. High-definition video requires file sizes
that are several times those of standard definition
content and anecdotal evidence suggest that the
spectrum of content available in high-definition
formats (1080p or 720p) is still far below that of
the old standard television resolution.
Conclusion
Protocol design creates incentives that
determine, among other things, the range of
titles available on a given platform. Online sharing
involves relatively high costs (e.g. the decrypting,
copying and recoding or “ripping” of a com-
mercial DVD in a compressed and unencrypted
digital format) incurred by publishers of material
and much smaller costs for those who simply
share files which they have already downloaded.
The world of online file-sharing is not simply a
free-for-all of illegal material but rather an almost
organic self-organising economy which manages
to allocate scarce resources and supply consumer
demand. It has even been suggested that digital
downloads often help to increase sales offline
(Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006). The modelling of
P2P networking presents a fascinating opportunity
for network economists and applied mathemati-
cians, with much to be done to formulate a
realistic model that properly incorporates the
dynamics of the system. Observing the spread
of high-definition content will provide further
data but will also require a model of consumers’
preference for high-quality content.
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